The presidential elections held June 12 in Iran have reached a defining moment in the history of the Islamic Republic, returned from years of hard battle (albeit indirectly) with the United States and the West in general. The years of the Ahmadinejad presidency saw the rise in the country of a new political class conservative but secular, a class that was no longer a direct expression of the clergy, but that had formed in the years of the Iran-Iraq war, is often closely linked to Revolutionary Guard, from which comes the same Ahmadinejad. And 'this new political class, helped by the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, who has managed in recent years the opposition to the Bush administration and the difficult crisis to Iran's nuclear program,

also in some way (>>>) son of Iran-Iraq war. In an international political climate certainly different - mainly due to the presence of a new American president in the White House, but also to the emergence of a global economic crisis that has resulted among other things, the collapse in oil prices (further damaging the Iranian economy ) - there was a tight election campaign in Iran, which ended with the elections on June 12. The unexpected turn that events have taken testimony, inter alia, the complexity of the political realities of Iran, which are involved in many plans that just affix in a network often difficult to decipher. This complexity is confirmed by the various and contradictory opinions expressed by the analysts and experts from the international press about the events of recent days. To summarize briefly, we can say that the essential factor that had emerged during the election campaign was the emergence inside of the establishment, of a broad coalition of moderates and conservatives joined by hostility against Ahmadinejad and his policies . The coalition has gathered around the candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi, but it really pulling the strings Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, chairman of the Assembly of Experts and "gray eminence" of Iranian politics, a figure that runs an endless economic empire, and that has always been able to attract around him vast political and economic interests. The mixed front around the compotators Mousavi candidate has managed, through a carefully organized campaign to earn the support of large sections of the population, and had taken in particular on young people, whose vote was crucial, given that half of Voters in Iran are younger than 30 years. This has prompted many media at an international level to commit itself in the very last days of the election campaign, providing a possible victory Mousavi. As some commentators have noted, this does not mean that Ahmadinejad had not also a broad base of consensus, so the most logical outcome would be a tight head-to-head between the two candidates, which is likely to be decided second round of elections. But the decisive battle, judging by the daring way in which they were announced the results of the consultation seems to have happened not in the polls, but in the heart of the regime. According to some analysts, the real clash is not in place between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, but between Rafsanjani and the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei. The turning point may have occurred when it was realized that the challenge facing by heterogeneous flow collected around Mousavi was not actually directed against Amhadinejad but ultimately against him. This would have worried that Khamenei was the birth of a front of "reformers" and conservative elements, in collaboration with the clergy and Rafsanjani, which ultimately could greatly reduce its power. In this regard, several observers have pointed out that in the game there is also the appointment of future Supreme Guide, having regard to the precarious state of health of Khamenei and his no longer young. Who, among the two contenders, the winner will come out of this confrontation will have in its hands the power to actually appoint the next supreme leader of the country. Others have noted that between Khamenei and Rafsanjani have historic rivalries that are also reflected in a potential conflict between those who are the two pillars of the regime: The Revolutionary Guard and the clergy. If Rafsanjani has close relations with the latter, Khamenei is in large part the creator of 'impressive rise of the Revolutionary Guard in recent years, an ascent which frightens many of those who supported the candidacy of Mousavi. These tensions within the regime have exploded in the elections. The two opposing sides were both ready to give battle, and the trial of strength was temporarily won by Khamenei during the consultations on 12 June, but probably not through a democratic process, but through a mere exercise of power. On the other hand, some commentators have pointed out that if it was the premature announcement of the victory of Ahmadinejad, has been equally premature claims of victory from Mousavi, he made an even earlier time. It therefore seems clear that both sides were prepared to fight, even with no means exclusively "election." After all, most analysts seem to be the view that there has been rigged, even if the agreement is not unanimous. On the other hand, the Iranian election process itself is opaque, and may inevitably give rise to doubts and suspicions of manipulation. In any case, recently was published a study by Chatham House, a major British institution, which seems to confirm the theory of electoral fraud. The new figure but fits into this clash of power within the system is the popular reaction that goes beyond the claims of electoral Mousavi, and is a real expression of discontent against the regime as a whole, although Officially it is a protest against the election results. For many, Mousavi is a figure-dressing for both the front and inside of the political regime is opposed to the Supreme Guide Khamenei, is the popular face in seeking justice squares. Do not forget that he himself is a figure within the system of the Islamic Republic. Only the coming days will tell us whether he will be able to really take over the reins of the protest. Remains to highlight the considerations that some analysts have made about the nature of popular protest. If in the West many have called the "Revolution of Twitter" painting (and trivialize) as a spontaneous rebellion against a tyrannical regime, most commentators penetrates to the reality of Iran have pointed out that, at present, in dance there is the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, but the definition of what it really is. Both sides in the conflict claim for himself the possession of the correct interpretation of the Islamic Revolution, and claim to be the true followers of the ideal of Islamic justice. It is on this ground that the parties in conflict will be played to win, because that is where they can earn the support of three key elements that will decide this game: the clergy, the Revolutionary Guard (apparatus security in general) and the popular masses.