The revelation by the Iranian regime that Iran is pursuing the construction of a second uranium enrichment plant near the holy city of Qom has dealt a blow to the already faltering efforts of Obama to open a dialogue with Tehran . The United States today still cling more firmly to the vain hope that international pressure and internal instability may lead to important changes in decision-making in Iran. However, based on conversations we've had in recent days with senior Iranian officials - including the president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - we consider it highly unlikely that Iran will accept ultimatums by the international community. It is also unlikely that Russia and China support sanctions that will never be able to cripple Iran. After this all

too likely scenario will be established, the Obama administration will, as a result of his weakness and indecision, with a very small leeway for dealing with Iran. As President Obama has gathered around him a team for the national security, for the most part, does not share his initial vision of a US-Iranian rapprochement, his administration has never publicly prepared the way for the opening of dialogue. The prospect of a dialogue is still largely seen as part of a channel intended to "reward" Iran's affirmative action and "punish" problem behaviors - exactly what Obama, as presidential candidate, criticized so eloquently in 'approach of President George W. Bush. United Nations General Assembly last week, President Obama used a speech reminiscent of the 'axis of evil "by Bush to identify Iran and North Korea as the main threats to world peace, and promised being considered as "responsible." This approach has prompted Ahmadinejad during a meeting last week to declare that Iran does not believe that Americans are "serious" on strategic cooperation. He argued that, when Iran had agreed in the past to limit its nuclear development - as when he suspended the enrichment of uranium between 2003 and 2005 - the Western powers have offered nothing in return, and instead tried to "further restrict our rights." At the time, it was something more than just a diplomatic failure by the West - was also a blow to the credibility of the political reformers in Iran. And 'perhaps a surprise, then, that no candidate in recent presidential elections in Iran has passed new restrictions on unilateral nuclear program of his country? Ahmadinejad reiterated that it should be possible to cooperate with Washington to resolve the nuclear issue, but only as part of a larger strategic agreement - something that the Obama administration did not accept. In the absence of some agreement with Washington on its long-term goals, the Iranian national security strategy will continue to place emphasis on defense "asymmetric" against what is perceived as an American encirclement. Over several years, officials of both governments, the reformist Mohammad Khatami and the conservative Ahmadinejad, told us that this defensive strategy is to cultivate ties with political forces and militias in other states in the region, developing missile capabilities Iran (as underlined by the medium-range missile tests this weekend), and push the limits of the obligations of non-proliferation of Tehran until it was close to having the ability and the ingredients for weapons of nuclear fission. It seems hardly a coincidence that Iran is accused of having launched the construction of the installation of Qom in 2005 - just when Tehran had concluded that the suspension of enrichment was not able to reduce American hostility. American officials tend to minimize the concerns about the Iranian American intentions, citing public messages from Obama Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran, as evidence of the seriousness of the U.S. diplomatic mission. But Tehran has seen this as an attempt to circumvent the Iranian president - another déjà vu, in a pattern dating back to the Iran-Contra era of Ronald Reagan, of American administrations that seek to create channels that lead to the Iranian "moderates "rather than dealing with the Islamic Republic as a system. President Ahmadinejad stressed this point before us, noting that Obama has never responded to his letter of congratulations after the 2008 elections in the United States - a letter which, he stressed, is a gesture had been "unprecedented" and " not easy to make "in Iran. The lack of seriousness on the part of Obama's diplomatic goes beyond mere clumsy tactics, but reflects an inadequate understanding of the strategic need for constructive relations between America and Iran. If an American president believed that such a relationship is profoundly in our national interests - such as President Richard Nixon to open diplomatic judged against China - would prove to accept the Islamic Republic, even though the behavior of Iran had continued to be problematic short term. After taking office in 1969, Nixon ordered the CIA to block the covert operations in Tibet and arranged for the Navy stopped its usual patrolling the Straits of Taiwan, although China continues to supply weapons to kill American soldiers in Vietnam. President Obama has had several opportunities to send analog signals to Tehran - such as the ability to end the Bush-era covert operations against Iran - but preferred to prevaricate. Unfortunately, the Obama administration was attracted by the prospect of instability that could lead to the overthrow of the regime following the presidential election this summer in Iran. But compared to the upheavals that occurred during the past 30 years of history of the Islamic Republic - the forced exile of a president, the assassination of another, the eight year war with Iraq, and the hasty replacement of the first successor of ' Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, with Ayatollah Khamenei - the controversy this year's election is by no means a catastrophic event. Moreover - and despite the remarks of the President of Russia Dmitri Medvedev that sanctions are "sometimes unavoidable" - the de-concentration of Obama's attempt to gather the support necessary to impose effective economic sanctions is delusional. For three years, Moscow has enough support on penalties to bring the nuclear issue before the Security Council, as Russian officials estimate that this is the best way to limit the American unilateral action. But Russia has consistently undermined the sanctions actually authorized. Several high-level Russian diplomats say that Moscow still has not decided whether to support any additional measure. Moscow could agree to marginal expansion of existing sanctions, but will not accept substantial costs for its own economic and strategic interests by supporting significantly more stringent measures. China could also accept marginal expansion of existing sanctions, but does not approve measures that harm important interests in China. The proposal advanced by Obama, according to which Saudi Arabia could "replace" the oil that China imports from Iran today, plays in a completely erroneous calculations related to Beijing's energy security. China is not only continuing to buy large quantities of Iranian oil, but Chinese companies are also developing substantial energy investments in Iran - rightly confident that Washington would not sanction Chinese companies because of energy investments in that country. The Chinese military leaders are particularly focused on the possibility that oil Iranians come to China through pipelines that cross the central Asia, rather than through sea routes vulnerable American naval interdiction. Iran is the only country in the Persian Gulf to China that can offer such a diversification of supply sources and transit routes. The Obama administration, perhaps hoping that a campaign - even ineffective - sanctions "crippling" able to stand up to those in Washington and elsewhere, support a military strike against Iran. This sadly reminds us of our experiences at the State Department and the National Security Council at the time the Bush administration, when officials who opposed the Iraq war have supported the "smart sanctions", and a more rigorous containment of the system of Saddam Hussein, as a workaround. Such appeals have not done anything to change the calculations of Saddam Hussein, and have been overwhelmed by accusations of proportion regarding the renewed efforts of Iraq to build nuclear weapons. Instead of continuing the lie that the sanctions will give America a capacity of pressure on the Iranian decision-making process - a strategy that will resolve itself or a failure or a war - the U.S. administration should seek a strategic realignment with Iran , as deep as those carried out by Nixon to China. This would require Washington to adopt measures so frank, to reassure Tehran that the rapprochement will serve the strategic needs of Iran. On this basis, America and Iran could draw an overall framework for economic cooperation and security - something Washington has never allowed the Group 5 +1 to propose. In this context, the international community would work with Iran to develop its civilian nuclear program, including activities related to the production of fuel on Iranian soil, in a transparent manner, rather than demanding that Tehran give evidence in a negative sense - that is, not is developing nuclear weapons. A cooperative approach is not demonizing Iran for its political relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah, but would seek a commitment to Tehran to work for the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. Some might say that this is a small price to pay for improved relations with Iran. But the price is high only for those who value the failed policies that have damaged American interests in the Middle East, and made less secure our allies over there.